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We estimate the marginal returns to spending on Crop Variable Inputs (CVI) (such as 
fertilizers and crop protection), to explore whether observed spending maximises physical 
or economic returns to farmers.  Data are taken from the Farm Business Survey for 2004-
2013, where gross margins and input spending are available, in over 10,300 crops of 
conventional winter wheat or oilseed rape in England and Wales. Marginal spending on CVIs 
generate financial returns significantly less than £1 per marginal pound spent.  This suggests 
that expenditure on CVIs exceeds an economic optimum that would maximise profit.  
However marginal physical products (crop yields) are positive, but small and significantly 
different from zero. This suggests that, on average, farmers approximately maximise yields.  
These results hold across a wide range of alternative economic models and two crop 
species.  Similar results have been reported in estimations for Indian grain production and 
for maize in China. In practice, farmers are making decisions on input use in advance of 
having information on a variety of factors, including future yield, product quality and price, 
making it difficult to optimise input levels according to expected profit.  Farmers may be 
consistently optimistic, prefer to avoid risk, or deliberately seek to maximise yields.  Some 
farmers may put on the standard recommended application irrespective of input or 
expected output price.  It is also possible that advice may sometimes aim to maximise yield, 
influenced by an incentive to encourage greater sales.  Excessive input use both reduces 
private profits and is a cause of environmental damage. There are thus potential private as 
well as social benefits to be gained from optimising levels of input use. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Crop production incurs a mix of fixed and variable costs - such as the costs of seeds, fertilizer 
and pesticides - the levels of which vary in direct proportion to the level of production.  Crop 
profitability critically depends on the costs of these variable inputs (Lawes and Gilbert 1879; 
Barnard and Nix 1979; Cato, cited in Campbell 2000; Van Alfen 2014), termed the Variable 
Costs of Production. 
 
Typically, in agricultural production fixed costs account for about 60 per cent of total costs 
and variable costs about 40 per cent (Lang 2015).  While fixed costs are by definition not 
readily altered from year to year, farmers have control over the levels of variable inputs and 
hence the level of variable costs.  Thus decisions as to what level of variable inputs to apply 
are a significant determinant of the profitability of crop production.  For example, in the 
2012 harvest year, in production of (non-organic) winter wheat in England, variable costs 
(VC) accounted for 41 per cent of crop economic output (CEO).  The resulting Gross Margin 
(GM=CEO-VC) was 59 per cent of crop economic output.  After deducting 60 per cent of 
crop economic output for fixed costs, this results in a negative net profit in wheat 
production, for this year before taking account of subsidies (Lang 2015). 
 
In classic production economics, profit will be maximised when, for each individual input, 
the Value of the Marginal Product (VMP) (the revenue gained by the farmer from the sale of 
the output generated by the last unit of input) is equal to the Marginal Cost (MC) (the cost 
of the last unit of input).  Prior to this point, further units of input will increase profit, 
beyond this point costs will exceed revenue.  In order to maximise profit, then farmers may 
be expected to follow this rule (Nelson and Ibach 1957; Barnard and Nix 1979; Olson 2004; 
IFIA 2007; Defra 2010).   
 
In practice, the position is more complex.  Farmers have to decide ex ante on the levels of 
inputs to apply, in advance of knowing the conditions under which production will take 
place or the price at which their product will be sold.  In this context, farmers may simply 
follow a standard recommendation, irrespective of the current or expected circumstances, 
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or they may take a risk averse approach and apply higher levels of inputs in order to ensure 
that they achieve a 'good' yield. 
 
Evidence from other countries suggests that farmers may on average apply higher levels of 
inputs than maximise financial return.  Research in China on current Chinese maize 
cultivation practices (Xu et al 2014) estimates that farmers could increase profits, and save 
US$50/hectare in variable costs for nitrogen, by applying an average of 67kg/ha (30%) less 
nitrogen than average farmer practice of 224 kgN/ha maize.  This was based on 408 trials 
over 2010-2012 in the prime maize growing region of the eastern seaboard states.  
Moreover, Zhang et al (2015) observe marginal losses of Rm0.1-0.55 per marginal Rm spent 
on pesticides.  In Indian grain production, using World Bank (2014) functions, average 
marginal returns were estimated to be small - with marginal production being circa Rs0.45 
of cereals/ per Rs of fertiliser spending (a loss of Rs 0.55 /Rs at the margin)1).   
 
At a global level, it is estimated that current world cereal production could be achieved, with 
approximately 50 per cent less nitrogen (Mueller et al 2014), if application rates were 
optimised across the world.  Under this scenario, Mueller et al (2014) estimate for England 
that nitrogen applications would decrease by 27%, from an assumed average application 
across all grains in the year 2000 of 127kgN/ha2.   
 
But this is not always the case.  In Sweden for example, at the peak of post-war technical 
change in farming and in the context of strong policies to boost production, farmers were 
estimated to be able to achieve marginal products of $3.5-to-2.1 per marginal $1 of fertiliser 
expenditure (Heady and Dillon 1961).  In less intensive systems, Kenyan farmers were 
recently estimated to achieve much higher returns, with a ratio for VMP to MC measured at 
1.7 (Sheahan et al 2013).   
 
 
                                                          
1 Author calculations based on averages for the breadbasket areas of ‘High Yields - where production was Not 
Growing’. 
2 This figure seems low given BSFP 2014 recommendations in excess of this level. 
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The level of input use in crop production also has wider social implications.  Leaching of 
chemicals from agricultural production represents a significant external cost due to its 
impacts on water quality (Carpenter et al 1998).  The standards set under the EU Water 
Framework Directive are likely to require a reduction in levels of diffuse pollution from 
agriculture (Sutton 2011).  These same arguments apply to the use of pesticides. 
 
This implies that the social cost of input use exceeds the private cost, and hence that the 
socially optimal level of input use will be lower than the privately optimal level.  The social 
cost includes costs that are not borne by producers but by other actors or society more 
generally.  The private cost is borne by producers only.  Thus, some estimates suggest that 
the Socially Optimal N-Rate is at least 50 kgN/ha less than the Privately Optimal N-Rate 
(which does not account for social costs or other externalities), determined by the European 
Nitrogen Assessment (Brink and van Grinsven, 2011), for cereals in Northern Europe3.   
 
The efficiency of input use is thus an issue of importance, both for the private financial 
performance on farms as well as for public policy making.  Levels of current spending on 
fertilisers and other variable inputs may not be optimal.  It is therefore important to explore 
the position in the UK as there has been no systematic analysis of farm business data in 
order to assess these issues.  So, the objective of this paper is to quantify the marginal 
returns to crop variable input spending, drawing on data from the Farm Business Survey, in 
order to assess the efficiency of input spending rates on crop farms in England. 
 
 
2. Method 
 
The analysis used the fixed effects econometric analysis to extract deterministic 
relationships from economic datasets (Mundlak 1961).  It is a powerful technique developed 
in the late 1950s and is now a standard approach in many fields of financial, real estate and 
economic analysis (Brooks 2014; Angrist and Pischke 2009).  Mundlak's (1961) methodology 
obtains coefficients that are free of management bias by controlling for other sources of 
                                                          
3 Which Brink and van Grinsven (2011) posit could incur a 20 per cent yield penalty.  However in England it is 
estimated that this is likely to incur an aggregate yield penalty of only 5 per cent (ADAS, pers. comm.). 
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unobserved heterogeneity.  These potential sources include both those permanent factors 
specific to an individual farm and farmer, such as soils, farm specific fertility and persistent 
weed burdens, aspect and location, education and skill, as well as those factors specific to 
an individual year, such as market and weather conditions.  We use the fixed effects 
estimation because it is expected that some of the variables not considered in the model 
(and therefore would otherwise appear in the error term) might be correlated with the 
independent variables (e.g. management, which is not included in the model, and therefore 
is part of the error term, may affect the use of inputs and make the regression coefficients 
biased) (Brooks 2014; Angrist and Pischke 2009; Chavas et al 2010).  The remaining variation 
thus represents the variation within farms, essentially the individual farmers' deviations 
from their own average spending on variable costs (adjusted for general inflation).   
 
This is illustrated, schematically, in Figure 1.  The vertical axis is modelled wheat yield, and 
the horizontal axis is deviation (from the assumed optimum average application rate).  Each 
curve represents an assumed class of result (farm*year) for an average farm.  These are 
then normalised with fixed effects for individual years and individual farms, so that all of the 
points are brought to one curve and can then be regressed against deviation from the 
assumed optimum application rate. 
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Figure 1.  Schematic representation of the analysis - which illustrates the normalisation by 
"Year" and "Farm" Fixed Effects (vertical constants), and the use of "within farm variation in 
fertilizer use" (within farm deviations - from the farm optimum) - to normalise horizontally. 
 
 
We focus in this paper on how farmers respond by adjusting input application rates, when 
for example relative prices of fertilisers or grains change.  In order to assess how farmers 
optimise expenditure on variable inputs, we use historic spending on fertilisers, seeds or 
chemicals - unadjusted except for general changes in inflation.   
 
For the linear case, the within farm variation (in spending on crop-variable-inputs), with 
fixed effects for farms and years, is given as: 
 
Outputti = a + b1Ferts + b2Sprays + b3Seed + b4Othr + ctYeart + ciFarmi + eit 
 
Where the dependant variable is Output per hectare (in year t, on farm i), being either Crop 
Gross Margin (GM) (£ per hectare), Crop Economic Output (CEO) (£ per hectare), or Crop 
Yield (Yld) (kilograms per hectare).  These variables were regressed on farm deviations from 
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the mean spending rate of each individual farm: for fertilisers (Ferts); all crop protection 
(Sprays); seeds (Seed); and other crop variable costs (such as agronomy charges, baling 
twine or packaging, but excluding heating and drying costs or fuel because spending on fuel 
for machinery is not allocated to specific crops in the Farm Business Survey) (Othr).   
 
Spending variables in the above equation are expressed as individual-farm-deviations from 
the individual-farm-mean, in £ per hectare.  That is to say within farm variation in spending 
per hectare, e.g. a series of [Fertti minus Mean_Ferti].  Year and Farm effects, (Yeart and 
Farmi), are dummy variables for each respective degree of freedom (t-1 and i-1) (to average 
out variation between years and between farms).  And eit is the residual variation 
(Farms*Years). 
 
While this is a production function, in the sense that we calculate effects on output of 
production factors, for unobserved factors of production (the omitted variables), it depends 
on terms that are specific to each individual farm and to each individual year. The b1 to 4 
coefficients are thus the linear effects, because they represent the return to changes in 
spending on these inputs at the margin.  They are thus the tangents (for limited variation) to 
the aggregate production function, for GM, CEO or Yld, of an additional one £ per hectare 
spent on that particular Crop Variable Input beyond the individual farm mean, averaged 
across years and farms.  These coefficients therefore represent ‘marginal profit’ (Gross 
Margin), ‘marginal economic output’ (Crop EO), or ‘marginal physical product’ (Yield), per 
marginal cost.  Or, put more simply, the effect of the last pound of spending on these 
variables.  
 
It should be noted that other model specifications that have been adopted in the literature, 
including translog and quadratic forms (Brooks 2014; Angrist and Pischke 2009; Chavas et al 
2010), were also tested.  Models were tested too for within year variation between farms 
with proxies for known variation in farm characteristics (so, in that case, the residual 
variation was farm).  All-inputs-variation for between-farms variation in farm-mean 
spending was similarly modelled.  Results from these alternative models are not presented 
as no materially different results were observed. 
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The regressions are generally assumed to be independent of scale effects, because the 
factors of interest are variable costs which vary in direct proportion to the scale of the 
enterprise expressed per unit area (hectares) of sown land.  This is the dimension that is 
used in practice, and understood, by farmers.  It is also the correct dimension in which to 
analyse the effect of changing the rates of spending on these variable costs.  Hence we do 
not investigate the substitutability of land, labour, machinery and fertilisers (Clark et al 
2013).   
 
Regressions were estimated with and without population weights which aggregate on 
unrelated strata variables (Defra 2015).  As may be expected, this weighting increased 
standard errors, by around 2%, for the coefficients that are of interest. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
Data were drawn from the Farm Business Survey (Defra 2015), which is a stratified, random 
unbalanced, panel survey including 1,656 farm businesses in England and Wales that have 
more than €25,000 standard agricultural output and a labour input greater than 0.5 full-
time-equivalents.  The analysis here uses derived variables and measures of: Gross Margins 
(GMs), yields, and variable costs of conventional winter wheat and conventional winter 
oilseed rape over the harvest years 2004 to 2013 inclusive (Table 1).   
 
Winter Wheat: The mean total area of crop sown was 82.9 hectares per farm (all of which 
were non-organic, or conventional, crops) and mean grain yield per hectare per farm 
business was 7.8 tonnes per hectare (Table 2 and Appendix I).  No one crop on any one farm 
in any year had zero economic output (and so it was not necessary to exclude any crop so as 
to be able to fit the Translog model detailed below).   
 
Winter Oilseed Rape: The mean total area per farm was 51.0 hectares and mean yield 3.4 
tonnes per hectare per farm business (Appendix II), of which only one crop in one year on 
one farm had zero economic output.  This was excluded from the sample so as to be able to 
fit the Translog model.   
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Given a mean total area per farm of 201 hectares, and utilised agricultural area of 194 
hectares, this stratified random sample (of up to 8% of all cereals and general cropping 
farms in England and Wales) closely resembles the typical cropping patterns in English grain 
production, where cereal farms had in 2012 a mean area of 200 hectares with 75 hectares 
of winter wheat (Lang 2015).   
 
All financial values were deflated to 2013 pounds sterling (£) using standard GDP deflators 
from UK HM Treasury. 
 
Table 1.  FBS sample for gross margins 2004-2013. 
 Conventional Winter 
Wheat 
Conventional Winter 
Oilseed Rape 
Crops (of one arable "non-organic" crop 
species, on one farm, in one year) 
6,948 3,449 
Farms in sample 1,656 895 
Years (2004/5-2013/14) up to 10 up to 10 
Farms with at least 4 or more years' 
observations 
789 502 
 
 
Table 2(a).  Ten year average costs and output in the FBS gross margins sample 2004-2013 
(£/ha).  Performance bands were ranked by gross margin per hectare. (s.e.m. in parenthesis) 
£ / hectare sown (in 2013 GBP) Winter 
Oilseed 
Rape - all 
Winter 
Wheat - all 
Wheat Low 
25% 
Performance 
Wheat Mid 
50% Perf. 
Wheat High 
25% 
Performance 
Fertilisers (average) 
178.5  
(1.352) 
160.7  
(0.909) 
166.2  
(2.967) 
161.4  
(1.246) 
157.4  
(1.437) 
Crop protection (average) 
151.5  
(0.988) 
153.9  
(0.633) 
148.7  
(1.881) 
154.6  
(0.874) 
155  
(1.044) 
Seeds (average) 
49.04  
(0.482) 
59.9  
(0.321) 
64.47  
(1.04) 
61.32  
(0.429) 
55.92  
(0.525) 
Other Variable Costs (average) 
21.58  
(0.481) 
26.5  
(0.504) 
28.99  
(1.592) 
28.64  
(0.735) 
22.21  
(0.71) 
Total Variable Costs 400.6 401.0 408.4 406.0 390.5 
Crop produced (tonnes/ha) 
3.415  
(0.0144) 
7.811  
(0.0193) 
7.129  
(0.0595) 
7.729  
(0.0256) 
8.203  
(0.0312) 
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Table 2(b).  Ten year average costs and output in the FBS gross margins sample 2004-2013 
(£ per tonne).  Performance bands were ranked by gross margin per hectare. 
£ / tonne grain (in 2013 GBP) WOSR - 
all 
Winter 
Wheat - all 
Wheat Low 
25% 
Performance 
Wheat Mid 
50%  
Performance. 
Wheat High 
25% 
Performance 
Fertilisers (average) 52.3 20.6 23.3 20.9 19.2 
Crop protection (average) 44.4 19.7 20.9 20.0 18.9 
Seeds (average) 14.4 7.7 9.0 7.9 6.8 
Other Variable Costs (average) 6.3 3.4 4.1 3.7 2.7 
Total Variable Costs 117.3 51.3 57.3 52.5 47.6 
Crop Economic Output (average) 298.4 135.2 124.6 133.8 140.8 
Gross Margin 181.1 83.9 67.3 81.3 93.2 
Number of crops in sample 3,449 6,948 910 3,680 2,358 
 
There do not appear to be systematic biases or consistent trends in relative spending on inputs.  For 
example, Figure 2 shows the distribution of farm deviations from individual farm mean spending in 
winter wheat on variable inputs, across the time series.  As can be seen, the range of deviations 
within each year is fairly small, indicating that farmers did not typically vary practice greatly. 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of farm deviations, from individual farm mean spending in winter 
wheat on fertilisers, other crop costs, seeds, and crop protection, by years (£ per hectare). 
 
Fertilisers      Other crop spending 
Seeds       Crop protection 
 
 
 
4. Results   
 
Marginal coefficients for GM, for both winter wheat and winter oilseed rape, of spending an 
extra unit on Fertilizers, Sprays, Seed and Other inputs beyond the individual farm means 
are all negative, significantly different from zero (Table 3).  And is robust to alternative 
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model specifications (for instance the Wald-Wolfowitz runs test was 173 for GM on "within-
farms-fertiliser-variation", associated with 1% of the observed variance, and p < 0.001).   
 
The marginal GM coefficients thus imply that marginal expenditure is loss making, i.e. the 
marginal GM is negative because marginal costs exceed marginal returns.  Marginal 
coefficients for Economic Output are positive.  Consistently with this, marginal coefficients 
for physical production (yield) are small, but positive, and significantly different from zero 
(Table 3).  This may suggest that the input variables are causally related to yield, but the 
responses at the margin are small or, in other words, near the peak of the response curve 
and very close to maximum yield for that input, other things being equal.  This indicates that 
the marginal unit of input increases production but not sufficiently to pay back the cost of 
the input. 
 
Table 3.  Marginal returns of variable inputs observed in 10 years of the Farm Business 
Survey (2004-2013) for conventional crops of Winter Wheat and Winter Oil Seed Rape 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Marginal physical product (yield) of conventional Winter Wheat, with interaction terms for 
Peas-or-Beans on-farm in the preceding year 
 
Model Dependent 
variable*
Ferts† Sprays† Seeds† Other 
Variable 
Costs†
sample pseudo 
r²
Observation 
Standard 
Error
Wheat (within+years+farms) £GM/ha -.85 (.065) -.45 (.089) -1.24 (.164) -.54 (.107) 5,341   59.3 1,182
Wheat (all / unweighted) £GM/ha -.85 (.061) -.50 (.081) -1.19 (.148) -.58 (.103) 6,948   58.0 205
Winter Oilseed Rape £GM/ha -.76 (.095) -.26 (.127) -1.48 (.228) -.08 (.231) 2,927   61.2 232
Economic product (Wheat) £EO/ha .18 (.062) .48 (.085) -.23 (.156) .41 (.102) 5,341   64.3 125
Translog (Wheat) £EO/ha .22 (.097) .30 (.127) .25 (.219) .19 (.126) 5,341   66.7 -
Wheat yield (within+years+farms)kg/ha 1.51 (0.34) 3.72 (0.47) -0.76 (0.87) 1.62 (0.56) 5,341   51.4 6,231
Wheat yield (all/unweighted) kg/ha 1.39 (0.33) 3.42 (0.44) -0.89 (0.80) 2.18 (0.55) 6,948   53.2 1,102
Winter Oilseed Rape kg/ha 0.66 (0.27) 2.68 (0.36) -1.21 (0.65) 2.38 (0.66) 2,927   37.3 659
Wheat nil PeaBeanPots(t-1) kg/ha 0.31 (0.53) 3.65 (0.75) -0.66 (1.25) 1.50 (0.84) 2,410   49.0 6,679
*£GM/ha is Gross Margin (in £GBP per hectare). £EO/ha is Economic Output (in £GBP per hectare).
  kg/ha is grain yield per hectare sown.  Unless otherwise stated all regressions are for wheat,
  weighted and only include farms with >=4 observations.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
†deviations from individual farm means (in £GBP per hectare)
  Marginal economic outputs, for the Translog, were estimated at mean values.
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Dependent variable is kg wheat yield per hectare  
Parameter estimate s.e. t prob (est) 
w/i Farms Fertilizers (£/ha) 1.60 0.41 <.001 
w/i Ferts.PYPeaBnGT0 -0.85 0.69 0.219 
w/i Farms Sprays (£/ha) 3.00 0.57 <.001 
w/i Sprays.PYPeaBnGT0 1.96 1.18 0.097 
w/i Farms Seed (£/ha) -1.45 0.93 0.122 
w/i Farms Other exp's (£/ha) 2.44 0.62 <.001 
Constant 7,543 546 <.001 
 
 
It could be postulated that the effects we observe here are associated with crop rotations, 
as with a first wheat (after a break crop) less fertiliser could be applied but yields could be 
higher (because, for example, first wheats after legumes that fix nitrogen require less 
fertilizer and give higher yields).  This was tested by adding an interaction term for peas or 
beans in a previous year (somewhere on the farm).  For fertilizers the coefficient was not 
significantly different from zero (Table 4), whereas rotations may be expected to lead to a 
lower response to the application of fertilizers in first wheats, i.e. a lower marginal physical 
product (MPP).  However, most farms will have several fields of wheat (each possibly 
following a different crop) and so our observations are aggregated across several rotations 
on each farm in each year and also nitrogen fixing or heavily fertilised crops, such as field-
scale vegetables or potatoes, amount to only 15% of the area of cereals in England.  So the 
vast majority of wheat crops will not be following such break crops, making any possible 
effect of rotations difficult to identify with the available data. We do though, as noted 
above, identify the same loss-making marginal Gross Margins with near maximum yields for 
Winter Oilseed Rape which is not subject to this potential rotation effect, supporting the 
case that the that the results are not a consequence of crop rotation.   
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Findings 
In our results, yields appear to be nearly maximised.  This is reflected in marginal yields 
(MPP) that are small, positive and significantly greater than zero in both oilseed rape and 
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winter wheat.  So farmers appear to be making systematic decisions on spending on crop 
inputs in England and Wales.  This would not be the case if the losses observed at the 
margin were just an effect of prices.  In that case we would expect that the MEOs and MPPs 
would not be significantly different from zero.  Our results do suggest that farmers are 
consistently applying levels of inputs which, at the margin, cost more than they return in 
terms of increased financial product.   
 
Limitations of the method 
In the available data, prices and quantities of inputs are confounded in the observations and 
so we are not able to distinguish between contexts where farmers had to pay a higher price 
for their inputs and contexts in which they applied greater quantities of inputs or inputs of 
higher quality.  However in both economic teaching and in practice (Blagburn 1961; Barnard 
and Nix 1979; Olson 2004; Warren 1998) farmers are expected to respond to changes in 
prices.  So for example, if fertiliser prices fell (relative to grain) and farmers increased 
nutrient application rates to maximise returns, we do not adjust for this using separate 
indexes for prices of farm inputs and outputs because efficiency would in this context 
appear to decline unrealistically (Langton 2011). 
 
Possible reasons for excessive application levels 
We should emphasise that the results do not demonstrate that the application of inputs in 
total is not profitable.  The focus of this analysis is on marginal returns.  The results do not 
represent the average, or industry, profitability of variable input applications.  Thus for 
instance, we calculate that the average profit per kilogram of N ("UBoN" as defined by Brink 
and van Grinsven 2011) to be £2.32.  The application of N is clearly profitable.  By 
comparison, across Northern Europe the average profits from N-application were estimated 
to be €0.4 to €2.7 per kilogram of N applied (Brink and van Grinsven 2011). 
 
A first point to make is that the results do not appear to simply represent random errors.  
There is, of course, considerable uncertainty involved in making input decisions without 
knowledge of the production conditions or of future output prices.  But the consistent 
significance of the estimated coefficients indicates something more systematic.  One 
possible interpretation of this result might be that "the decision to apply more than average 
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to take advantage of the good years is appropriate since the cost of over-application is low 
compared to the cost of under-application" (Rajsic and Weersink, 2008, p56).  See also 
Rajsic, Weersink and Gandorfer (2009).  However, in the analysis we find evidence of 
systematic over-application.  If the large gains in a small number of good conditions were 
greater than the small losses in a larger number of poor conditions, we would expect to find 
that, overall, mean coefficients on gross margins were positive.  This was not the case and 
so we do not accept this argument here.  
 
The fact that farmers do not operate simply as profit maximisers is well accepted (e.g. 
Schwarze, et al., 2014).  Various explanations may be advanced in order to explain why 
farmers appear to be applying levels of inputs that exceed those that would maximise 
profits.  Sheriff (2005) includes the following possible reasons: i) The perceived limited 
relevance of recommendations to ‘my farm’, to ‘my county’, and to ‘this year’, be they 
official, such as in the UK RB209 (Defra 2010), or commercial, such as IFIA (2007), where 
farmers believe that the recommendation is too conservative or pessimistic; ii) 
Substitutability of limiting factors (where a farmer might apply extra nutrients where yields 
are limited by rainfall, and the farmer is optimistic about rain); iii) Opportunity costs; and iv) 
Uncertainty (especially in the context of large potential losses and small costs).   
 
Following from this, we consider various possible explanations for the apparent over 
application of inputs in the face of uncertainty, where yield, quality and prices are largely 
unknown at the time when the inputs are applied (ex ante).  However, we accept that it is 
unlikely that any single factor represents a sole cause.  Thus we consider: i) The possibility of 
unobserved costs; ii) The adoption of standard guidance; iii) Optimism; iv) Risk aversion; v) 
External advice; and vi) Agricultural subsidies. 
 
i) Unobserved cost 
It is not possible to observe the full range of costs facing farmers in making decisions about 
input levels.  In this context there are opportunity costs and costs of information.  Effort and 
time spent on increasing the precision of input applications has opportunity costs, such as in 
terms of work-hours available in autumn when farmers are under pressure to get other 
work completed.  Farmers may save time and other costs by the convenience and low cost 
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of ‘with seed’ applications of pesticides, or by the ease of application of standard mixes of 
fertiliser nutrients.  To some extent this will depend on the skills and experience of the 
farmer.  In this context then, some farmers may simply to follow standard input packages 
without reference to their own particular circumstances. 
 
ii) Standard guidance 
The standard recommendations for fertiliser applications in England, as provided in RB209 
(Defra 2010), may also bias practices towards higher input rates.  The recommended N level 
for England is set at the 98th percentile of the maximum yield on the response curve given in 
RB209 (because the ratio of grain prices to fertilizer prices is assumed to be 1/6 or 1/10).  
This corresponds very closely to the 5 year average application rate on winter wheat in 
Britain of 185 kgN/hectare (BSFP 2014).  Given random variation, this means that many 
applications will be well in excess of the level required for maximum yield.  The IFIA (2007) 
recommends applications at similar levels of the response curves, as do standard texts (e.g. 
Cooke 1982). 
 
A further factor that may bias industry results towards negative returns from the last unit of 
input is that no response to varying input rates (e.g. to N) is seen in many site-by-year 
combinations.  For example, 13 out of 30 (45%) site-by-year combinations in trials at 15 sites 
over 2005-2007 for the 2010 RB209 (Defra) gave no response to N (Sylvester-Bradley et al 
2008).  In such ‘site*years’ N-applications will, clearly, incur substantial losses.   
 
iii) Optimism 
Farmers may simply make systematic errors in assessing the levels of input to apply, where 
perhaps they anticipate a better growing season than generally eventuates.  Kahneman 
(2011) has pointed to ‘optimistic bias’ as potentially the most significant of the cognitive 
biases.  Farmers may apply levels of input that would be beneficial in the event of good 
growing conditions and prices but outcomes are not as good as anticipated and so the 
investments are not justified. 
 
iv) Risk aversion 
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Attitudes to risk may also play an important role in the results that we observe here.  Risk 
aversion may create an incentive for farmers to make prophylactic applications, applying 
extra inputs to reduce the risk of achieving low yields.  A strong preference to avoid a yield-
penalty may also be a factor leading to the observation of small marginal products and near 
maximum yields, perhaps influenced by negative self-image from having ‘poor’ looking 
crops or concerns about peer pressures when farmers continue to associate ‘good farming’ 
with high yields.   
 
v) External Advice 
Many farmers rely on external advice on the levels of inputs to apply.  We have little 
evidence on the basis on which this advice is given but these results raise various issues.  It 
is possible that advisors, as we have suggested might be the case with farmers, simply 
follow the standard recommendations with regard to fertiliser application rates.  It could be 
that with training in agronomy rather than in economics, the emphasis is on yields rather 
than profits.  Further, some advice is tied in with the sale of inputs.  This context raises the 
further possibility that advisors whose incomes rely on the sales of inputs may consciously 
or unconsciously have an incentive to recommend higher levels of input use than would 
otherwise be the case.  This is an issue that deserves further exploration.   
 
vi) Agricultural subsidies 
Direct payments to farmers in Europe are of the order of €230 per hectare, each year, under 
the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  While input suppliers, and for tenant farmers 
landlords, may capture some of this support (e.g. O’Neill and Hanrahan, 2016), the 
increased income may affect farmer behaviour.  The guaranteed income might reduce 
farmers’ degree of risk aversion, offsetting the previous effect, or potentially reduce their 
marginal utility of income.  In this context a farmer might opt for a simpler approach, 
applying standard levels of inputs rather than making the extra effort to maximise net profit.  
The net effect of CAP subsidies on input levels thus seems uncertain. 
 
 
Further work is needed in order to assess the relevance and importance of these possible 
alternative explanations for the observed results. 
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6. Conclusions  
 
The analysis has provided robust evidence that farmers are systematically applying rates of 
inputs that exceed the rates that would maximise their profits.  In contrast, their decisions 
appear to enable them to come close to applying levels of inputs that maximise yields.  The 
implication is that farmers could increase profits by applying lower levels of inputs.  At the 
same time, the environmental impacts of input uses indicate that there can also be 
potential social benefits associated from lower rates of input use through reduced external 
costs borne by other actors, such as pollution.  We have outlined possible explanations for 
the observed results.  Some of these could indicate that the private gains might be hard to 
achieve, such as where ‘over-applications’ arise from costs that have not been identified in 
this analysis.  Others could indicate ways in which profitability could be increased, such as if 
the results are explained by an excessive degree of optimism.  Further work is required to 
sort through these various alternative explanations.   
 
There is also a cautionary implication of the analysis for the adoption of price incentives as a 
means of shifting farmer decisions closer towards a social optimum.  If farmers are not 
reacting accurately to the prices that they currently face in the market, there can be little 
expectation that they would react accurately to prices altered in order to promote social or 
environmental objectives.  This is not to say that environmental taxes would not push farm 
level decisions in a desired direction, rather that we cannot expect such policies to deliver 
‘optimal’ outcomes. 
 
At this stage, we have not attempted to estimate the total losses associated with this 
apparent over-application of inputs.  Aggregate losses, to farmers and to society, should be 
estimated from the areas under the whole of the production function.  It will be interesting 
to derive the size of industry losses from these effects at the margin.  Strip trials and ‘field 
mosaics’ which will provide clearer information on the production functions are being 
actively explored by NIABTAG, AHDB Cereals and ADAS (ADAS 2017).  Vast and increasing 
quantities of data are being generated through precision farming, such as the field mosaics 
of Tru-Harvest/ ClimateCorp/ AgriData-Deere in the USA.  Researchers need to clarify and 
Reader et al: Farmers Not Maximising Profits with Variable Inputs 
 
disseminate the methods and algorithms for farm-level-optimisation using the big-data that 
is now available. 
 
In conclusion, further analysis is required to understand better the ways in which farmers 
make decisions and the incentives that they and their advisors face.  There are potential 
private and social benefits to be gained from better farm level decision making and this is an 
important goal for policy and research. 
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Appendix I.  Descriptive statistics for the Winter Wheat. 
Winter wheat crop variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error of 
mean 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Yield (t/ha) 7.811 7.887 1.611 0.0193 -0.441 0.691 
Area 82.92 47.23 118.7 1.424 4.958 42.04 
Gross Margin (£/ha) 724 691.5 316.9 3.801 0.451 0.312 
Economic output (/ha) 1,056 1,026 324.7 3.896 0.317 -0.169 
Bye-products (£/ha) 74.68 51.13 95.38 1.144 4.809 65.11 
log10 Economic output (/ha) 3.009 3.02 0.141 0.00191 -0.745 1.562 
Fertilizers (£/ha) 160.7 146.1 75.74 0.909 0.927 1.562 
Crop protection (£/ha) 153.9 150.6 52.79 0.633 0.767 5.347 
Seeds (£/ha) 59.9 55.75 26.79 0.321 3.447 47.9 
Other crop costs (£/ha) 26.5 11.36 42.05 0.504 3.051 12.69 
Contract costs (£/ha) 89.94 36.13 124.8 1.498 2.407 10.58 
log10 Ferts 2.148 2.173 0.353 0.00479 -6.097 51.7 
log10 Protects 2.165 2.183 0.211 0.00286 -7.792 110.8 
log10 Seeds 1.74 1.747 0.197 0.00267 -2.919 35.39 
log10 Other costs 0.774 1.069 1.015 0.0137 -0.748 -0.644 
Betw farms: Ferts 160.7 157.9 52.98 0.636 0.351 2.443 
Betw: Crop protection 153.9 152 40.43 0.485 0.0291 1.367 
Betw farms: Seeds 59.9 57.63 18.94 0.227 6.142 160.1 
Betw: Other costs 26.5 14.58 34.3 0.412 2.408 6.554 
Betw: Contract costs 89.94 42.38 111.7 1.341 2.106 9.618 
w/i farms: Ferts 0 -1.475 54.13 0.649 0.751 2.153 
w/i farms: Protects 0 0 33.94 0.407 1.3 17.92 
w/i farms: Seeds 0 -0.15 18.95 0.227 1.691 17.06 
w/i farms: Other crop costs 0 -0.152 24.31 0.292 2.408 28.81 
w/I farm: Contract costs 0 -0.308 55.66 0.668 1.17 18.65 
Weight all 32.9 29.38 20.91 0.251 1.771 6.8 
Source: Farm Business Survey (Defra 2015)  Notes: Production is in tonnes per hectare sown, others in £/hectare (or base 10 logarithms - 
where specified). n=6,948.  Inputs are per hectare figures, for all variation.  "Betw" are between farms variation in mean farm spending. 
"w/i" are individual farms' deviations from individual farm means ("within farm" variation). 
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Appendix II.  Descriptive statistics for the Winter Oilseed Rape (WOSR). 
Oilseed rape crop variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error of 
mean 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Yield (t/ha) 3.415 3.48 0.847 0.0144 -0.232 1.517 
Area 51.05 33.15 55.84 0.951 3.174 14.24 
Gross Margin (£/ha) 620.2 570.4 368.1 6.268 0.514 0.626 
Economic output (/ha) 1019 965 398.9 6.793 0.536 -0.0902 
Bye-products (£/ha) 4.495 0 18.71 0.318 5.607 38.47 
Fertilizers (£/ha) 178.5 161.3 79.39 1.352 1.558 8.539 
Crop protection (£/ha) 151.5 143.6 58.05 0.988 0.93 2.507 
Seeds (£/ha) 49.04 46.29 28.31 0.482 6.585 125 
Other crop costs (£/ha) 21.58 13.14 28.23 0.481 4.003 41.32 
Betw farms: Ferts 178.4 175.2 54.18 0.922 0.915 4.944 
Betw: Crop protection 151.4 146.4 44.15 0.751 0.761 2.12 
Betw farms: Seeds 49.03 47.21 20.94 0.356 11.48 368.3 
Betw: Other crop costs 21.59 15.75 21.99 0.374 2.234 8.442 
w/i farms: Ferts 0.05 -0.773 58.06 0.989 1.45 13.53 
w/i farms: Protects 0.0 0 37.72 0.642 0.239 3.123 
w/i farms: Seeds 0.0 -0.311 19.06 0.325 3.022 31.29 
w/i farms: Other costs 0.0 -0.081 17.67 0.301 2.672 60.81 
Weight all 33.15 30.14 19.5 0.351 2.03 8.516 
Source: Farm Business Survey (Defra 2015).  Notes: Production is in tonnes per hectare sown (t/ha), Area is in hectares (ha), others in 
£/hectare.  n=3,449.  Inputs are per hectare figures, for all variation.  "Betw" are between farms variation in mean farm spending.  "w/i" 
are individual farms' deviations from individual farm means ("within farms" variation). 
 
